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Are single and extended metaphors processed differently?  
A test of two Relevance-Theoretic accounts 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Carston (2010) proposes that metaphors can be processed via two different routes. In line 
with the standard Relevance-Theoretic account of loose use, single metaphors are interpreted 
by a local pragmatic process of meaning adjustment, resulting in the construction of an ad 
hoc concept. In extended metaphorical passages, by contrast, the reader switches to a second 
processing mode because the various semantic associates in the passage are mutually 
reinforcing, which makes the literal meaning highly activated relative to possible meaning 
adjustments. In the second processing mode the literal meaning of the whole passage is 
metarepresented and entertained as an ‘imaginary world’ and the intended figurative 
implications are derived later in processing. The results of three experiments comparing the 
interpretation of the same target expressions across literal, single-metaphorical and extended-
metaphorical contexts, using self-paced reading (Experiment 1), eye-tracking during natural 
reading (Experiment 2) and cued recall (Experiment 3), offered initial support to Carston’s 
distinction between the processing of single and extended metaphors. We end with a 
comparison between extended metaphors and allegories, and make a call for further 
theoretical and experimental work to increase our understanding of the similarities and 
differences between the interpretation and processing of different figurative uses, single and 
extended. 
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Introduction 
Working within a Relevance Theory approach, Carston (2010) argues that some metaphors 
are analogous to other instances of loose use, and that for these cases the linguistic meaning 
of the metaphoric vehicle is pragmatically modulated during comprehension. That is to say, 
the truth-conditional content (explicature, in RT terms) of the metaphor (1) is that the lawyer 
in question is a SHARK*. The ad hoc concept SHARK* is a pragmatically adjusted version of 
the lexically-encoded concept SHARK, with its denotation including a certain type of human 
beings as well as the marine creatures. 
(1) My lawyer is a shark. 
This view of the truth-conditional content of metaphors agrees with that of Glucksberg and 
Keysar (1990), who contend that metaphors such as (1) are indeed class-inclusion assertions, 
just as they appear to be. The process of obtaining the classically “metaphorical” meanings of 
(1) – such as that the lawyer is ruthless, merciless, etc. – is then presumed to be an inferential 
pragmatic process that involves the enhancement of relevant properties of the metaphor 
vehicle (here, “shark”) and the suppression of irrelevant properties (in this case, IS A FISH, 
SWIMS IN THE SEA, HAS FINS, etc.), although the precise nature of this process is disputed (see 
also Sperber and Wilson 2002, Recanati 2004). 
As Carston discusses, this kind of analysis is at odds with the intuition about metaphor 
articulated by Davidson (1978/1984: 263), who considers metaphors to have no propositional 
content other than their literal meaning and to be essentially imagistic, observing that “much 
of what we are caused [by metaphor] to notice is not propositional in character”. In Carston’s 
view, a comprehensive account of metaphor must acknowledge both the propositional and the 
imagistic component of metaphoric meaning, but also allow for the relative weights of these 
components to differ from case to case. By contrast with examples such as (1) in which the 
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propositional meaning predominates, Carston posits a second broad class of metaphors in 
which the literal meaning and its accompanying imagery is more dominant, with implicated 
propositional content only derived at a later stage (although possibly to some extent in 
parallel with the processing of the literal meaning).  In particular, she analyses cases of 
extended metaphor such as (2) as belonging to this latter class. 
(2) All the world’s a stage, 
 And all the men and women merely players. 
 They have their exits and their entrances 
 And one man in his time plays many parts  
(Shakespeare, As You Like It, Act 2, Scene VII) 
From the point of view of the ad hoc concept (propositional) approach, the interpretation of 
an extended metaphor would seem to require the construction of a series of ad hoc concepts: 
STAGE*, PLAYERS*, EXITS*, ENTRANCES* and PARTS* must all be constructed by the hearer, 
each reflecting the modulation of the appropriate literal meaning by pragmatic considerations. 
Carston (2010: 308) argues that instead, in such developed metaphor cases, the literal 
meaning of the words may take over from any adjustment process as the various strongly 
related literal meanings of the metaphor vehicles are mutually semantically primed and 
reinforced. So the literal meaning of the extended metaphor is entertained as a whole and it is 
this whole scenario that is the basis for the derivation of the ultimate ‘metaphorical meaning’. 
The expectation that the literal meaning of an extended metaphor should have this kind of 
internal coherence does not follow from the propositional account discussed above; that 
approach has little to say about how the literal meaning of one metaphor vehicle should 
influence the interpretation of subsequent metaphorically used words. Nevertheless, it seems 
clear that hearers do have these expectations, as shown by the perceived oddness of mixed 
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metaphors such as the following (Denys Parsons, letter in the New Scientist, 25 March 1971, 
p.704). 
(3) It is the thin end of a white elephant. 
(4) [They] have gone out of their way to rub in the bitter pill. 
(5) Mr Dewey would have been wielding a double-edged sword in the shape of a 
boomerang that would have come home to plague him. 
In a conceptual modulation account, these extended metaphors should be unproblematic. For 
instance, in (5), the concepts of DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD* and BOOMERANG* are completely 
compatible: both refer to a means of attacking someone that could also injure the person who 
uses it. The incongruity seems to arise because of the expectation that the metaphorical 
expressions will be internally coherent at a literal level as well as a metaphorical level, and 
this fails because of the difficulty of imagining a “double-edged sword in the shape of a 
boomerang”. The problem of mixed metaphor could be taken to support the claim that the 
interpretation of extended metaphors has a literal-imagistic component in addition to the 
ultimate propositional component, as Carston contends. 
 
Processing single and extended metaphors 
From a processing standpoint, one way to interpret the distinction between single 
(lexical/phrasal) metaphors and extended-imagistic metaphors is as a claim about the time-
course by which the metaphorical meanings are recovered by the hearer. Extended metaphors 
have to be internally coherent as regards their literal meaning (i.e. coherent within the 
imaginary world being described), but that is not all: they must, of course, also be 
interpretable as metaphors. The propositional account of metaphor interpretation would hold 
5 
 
that the appropriate ad hoc concepts (in the Shakespearian example, EXITS*, ENTRANCES*, 
etc.) are constructed on-line, and hence could be argued to predict that the metaphorical 
meanings associated with these ad hoc concepts (“death”, “birth”, etc.) should be 
immediately activated in the mind of the hearer. By contrast, the literal-imagistic account is 
not committed to this position: in extended metaphors “the literal meaning takes over and is 
metarepresented as a whole” (Carston 2010: 312) and the metaphoric meaning emerges more 
gradually from this holistic representation, in the form of an array of weakly implicated 
propositions (e.g., “human life is short”, “each individual’s actions are largely predictable and 
pre-determined”, “human existence has no greater meaning or purpose than a passing 
performance on a stage”, and so on). 
Existing experimental research on metaphor has not directly addressed this question, although 
it has begun to probe the time-course of literal and figurative associates of metaphorical 
expressions. In a series of studies, Glucksberg, Gernsbacher and colleagues (see Glucksberg 
et al. 2001) explored the effect of metaphors on the subsequent truth-value judgement of 
literal sentences. They showed that prior exposure to a sentence such as (6) speeded up 
verification of (7) but slowed down verification of (8) compared to a baseline, which they 
interpreted as evidence that metaphor interpretation does indeed involve enhancing relevant 
properties and suppressing irrelevant properties of the metaphor vehicle. 
(6) That defence lawyer is a shark. 
(7) Sharks are tenacious. 
(8) Sharks are good swimmers. 
Augmenting these findings, Rubio-Fernández (2007) further explored the persistence of 
literal meaning in the interpretation of metaphor, using a cross-modal lexical priming 
paradigm. Analogously to classic research on the disambiguation of homonyms (Swinney 
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1979 and others), Rubio-Fernández tested the time-course over which exposure to a metaphor 
vehicle would prime literally related words. She showed that these were primed at 0ms and 
400ms offsets from the word recognition point from the metaphor vehicle, but that priming at 
1000ms offset was only present for metaphorically relevant words. That is, given the prime 
(9), the recognition of “cat” as a real word was primed at 0ms and 400ms offset from the 
word “cheetah” but not at 1000ms offset, whereas the recognition of “fast” was primed at all 
three offsets. 
(9) Nobody wanted to run against John at school. John was a cheetah. 
In sum, then, the evidence from studies of single metaphors suggests that properties that are 
relevant for the metaphorical understanding (in terms of the propositional account, those that 
are part of the ad hoc concept) are promoted by hearers and remain highly activated for at 
least a second. By contrast, properties that are literally associated with the metaphor vehicle 
but are not part of the metaphorical meaning (those that are not part of the ad hoc concept) 
are initially activated but are suppressed sometime after 400ms has elapsed. 
The research discussed above, however, has concerned itself primarily with single metaphors, 
in which a single property is directly predicated of an entity (as in “John was a cheetah”). 
This confers certain advantages in making the materials easier to control and construct, as 
well as making it possible to compare metaphors with their minimally-different simile 
counterparts (a point of theoretical interest to researchers such as Glucksberg and Haught 
(2006)), but might diminish the generalisability of the results. Moreover, the way in which 
the materials were presented to participants could be argued to influence participants to 
compute the figurative meanings of metaphoric expressions as rapidly as possible. For 
instance, in Rubio-Fernández’s (2007) experiment, participants are explicitly instructed that 
each text ends in a metaphor, and that they should try to visualise the figurative meaning of 
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that metaphor (a request made in order to ensure that participants processed the stimuli as 
metaphors). Under these instructions it would be irrational for participants to switch to any 
literal-imagistic mode of processing, as it is purely the figurative meaning and not the literal 
meaning of the metaphor that the participant is instructed to recover. Literary texts, of course, 
do not come with any such instructions, so whether and to what extent readers persist in 
activating the literal associates remains an open question. 
 
The present study 
While Carston’s (2010) account of metaphor interpretation is psychologically oriented, a 
number of empirical questions remain open. For example, at what point does the reader 
switch from a literal to a figurative mode of processing when reading extended metaphors? 
And more generally, how do the two processing modes interact? Another important question 
is whether the two processing modes work differently depending on the type of metaphors 
encountered in an extended passage. For example, while it is conceivable that the literal 
meanings of relatively novel metaphors prime each other during processing, conventional 
metaphors may be more strongly associated with their figurative meanings and their literal 
interpretation may be relatively less accessible. This, in turn, may prevent readers from 
switching to a literal-imagistic mode of processing. This potential exception to Carston’s 
second processing route is related to a fundamental assumption of Lakoff and Johnsons’s 
(1980) view that people routinely use conceptual mappings to understand conventional 
expressions in discourse (a view that has been empirically tested with mixed results; see, e.g., 
Shen & Balaban, 1999; Keysar et al., 2000; Gentner et al. 2002; Thibodeau & Durgin, 2007). 
Given the open questions noted above, it is not straightforward to derive empirically testable 
predictions from Carston’s (2010) account of metaphor interpretation. However, there are 
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fundamental differences between Carston’s account and the standard Relevance-Theoretic 
account of loose use, which are potentially amenable to experimental investigation. The goal 
of this paper is therefore to explore whether readers of single and extended metaphors exhibit 
processing differences that could suggest, in line with Carston’s (2010) account, that 
extended metaphors are first interpreted literally-imagistically before the global metaphorical 
meaning is derived off-line, whereas single metaphors are propositionally and interpreted on-
line, as suggested by the traditional RT view.  
We aim to test potential differences between the processing single and extended metaphors 
by comparing the comprehension of the same expression in three distinct contexts: an 
extended metaphorical context (where there are multiple figurative uses in the passage, 
including the target expression), a single-metaphorical context (where the target expression is 
the only figurative use in the passage) and a literal context (where the entire passage is 
literal). In all cases, the target expression appears in the second half of the passage. The 
following triplet is a sample item, with the target expression in bold (for more items see the 
Appendix). 
Extended metaphor: The school’s pupils were notoriously unruly. The place was 
a zoo. New keepers were generally assigned to the safer animals: the half-
domesticated goats, the placid giraffes, the comical penguins. Those animals you 
could handle without protective gloves. It was both the more intelligent and the 
more aggressive animals that required extra safety measures. 
 
Single metaphor: The school’s pupils were notoriously unruly. New teachers 
were generally assigned to the less troublesome classes: the younger kids, the 
more settled ones, and the more relaxed ones. They seldom made a lot of trouble, 
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and you could work with them without protective gloves. It was both the more 
intelligent and the more aggressive pupils that required specialist care. 
Literal control: The animals at the sanctuary had come from many different 
places. Some of them had been pets of owners who had died or had to move away. 
They were usually docile, and you could handle them without protective gloves. 
Other animals had been abused, or even trained to attack. They required special 
safety measures. 
A possible criticism to this experimental design is that by manipulating the contexts 
preceding the target expressions, we do not only distinguish the different conditions but also 
introduce a large number of linguistic factors that could in principle affect the processing of 
the target expressions (e.g., varying word lengths and frequencies, different syntactic 
constructions, potential priming effects, or uneven flow of the narrative, just to name a few). 
While we acknowledge this shortcoming of our paradigm, we see it as inevitable insofar as it 
would be almost impossible to control for such a vast suite of potential factors in the 
construction of the materials. In other words, it would be extremely difficult to construct a 
battery of single metaphors, extended metaphors and literal controls that were preceded by 
contexts containing words of comparable length and frequency, identical syntactic 
constructions, the same potential priming effects, etc., while making sure that the passages 
are highly comprehensible.  
Most important for the present investigation, the potential effects that linguistic factors might 
have on the processing of the target expressions do not result in any specific hypotheses that 
could be pinned against the two Relevance-Theoretic accounts of metaphor interpretation 
investigated in this study. Therefore, in our view, the best we can do when comparing the 
processing of single and extended metaphors is to acknowledge the variability inherent in the 
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materials, and spell out in detail the predictions that follow from Carston’s (2010) model and 
the standard Relevance-Theoretic account based wholly on ad hoc concepts (e.g., Sperber & 
Wilson 2008).  
In the extended metaphorical contexts, Carston’s account can naturally be taken to predict 
that the literal meaning of the target expressions should be accessed and maintained, on the 
basis that readers should be in a literal mode of processing at this stage (as the literal meaning 
is primed by various associates, e.g., “zoo”, “goats”, “giraffes”, “penguins” and “animals” in 
the above example). By contrast, the single metaphors would be interpreted figuratively, by 
the reader pragmatically modulating the meaning of the metaphor vehicle, specifically 
broadening it radically to accommodate the metaphorical meaning. Consequently, Carston’s 
account predicts that (a) initially patterns of comprehension should be similar in the literal 
control and extended metaphor conditions (as these both initially receive literal 
interpretations) and that (b) these should both contrast with the single metaphor condition 
(whose figurative interpretation is recovered immediately). These interpretive differences are 
compatible with more directly measurable differences in processing effort, with the 
construction of ad hoc concepts in single-metaphorical contexts potentially requiring more 
processing resources than the literal interpretation of the target expressions in literal and 
extended metaphorical contexts. 
By contrast, on a standard RT account, both the single and extended metaphor conditions 
require the hearer to construct ad hoc concepts, and so would be expected to give rise to 
similar processing patterns. We might expect these to contrast with the literal condition, on 
the assumption that the hearer does not need to construct ad hoc concepts in the literal 
condition: the lexical concept will suffice, and no pragmatic modulation is required. Literal-
first accounts of metaphor interpretation such as those of Searle (1979) or Grice (1975) would 
also predict a contrast between the literal control and the metaphorical conditions. However, 
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given that the RT account holds that pragmatic modulation of word meanings is widespread 
(cf. Wilson & Carston 2007), it would also be compatible with a view in which all three 
conditions required the hearer to construct ad hoc concepts and hence all gave rise to broadly 
identical processing signatures. 
In summary, only Carston’s account predicts processing differences between single and 
extended metaphors, as a consequence of these types of expression being interpreted via 
different routes (i.e. ad hoc concept/propositional vs. literal/imagistic respectively). By 
contrast, the standard RT account of metaphor interpretation (based solely on ad hoc concept 
construction), as well as more traditional metaphor accounts (based on a literal-figurative 
distinction) wouldn’t predict processing differences between single and extended metaphors. 
While the absence of such differences would not necessarily disprove Carston’s account, 
under those circumstances, the traditional RT account could be argued to be more 
parsimonious in that it posits a single mode of metaphor processing. 
 
Pre-test of the materials 
In order to examine the processing of extended and single metaphors, we needed to establish 
a set of novel metaphorical expressions. Specifically, we required items whose metaphorical 
meanings could successfully be recovered by participants, but which were sufficiently 
unfamiliar that there was no possibility of their meanings being literally represented (as in the 
case of “dead metaphors” such as ‘the foot of a hill’). For this reason, we constructed and 
pre-tested our materials as discussed below.  
 
Method 
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Participants 
16 undergraduate and postgraduate students from University College London took part in the 
experiment. They were all native speakers of English and participated for monetary 
compensation (£3). 
Materials, design and procedure 
We constructed 21 extended metaphors (average number of words: 59; range: 44-77). 
Extended metaphors included a metaphoric expression early on in the passage and elaborated 
on a topic using figurative language throughout the passage (e.g., the ‘zoo’ metaphor in the 
example given above). The target metaphor in each passage was what we call a ‘secondary 
metaphor’ that appeared towards the end of the passage (e.g., ‘protective gloves’ in the 
example above). While meaningful in the context, secondary metaphors were not directly 
related to the main topic of the passage. This was done in order to avoid intra-lexical priming 
from possible associates in the text. 
We also constructed 21 single metaphors (average number of words: 57; range: 41-82) paired 
with the 21 extended metaphors. Single metaphors included a single metaphoric expression in 
the passage, which was the same as the secondary metaphors used in the extended metaphor 
condition. The context of the single metaphors was a literal version of the figurative context 
of extended metaphors. As in the case of the extended metaphors, we avoided intra-lexical 
priming of the target metaphor in the single metaphors. 
In order to pre-test our materials, we constructed two different lists of materials each 
including the complete set of 42 metaphors but presented in reverse order (i.e. extended 
metaphors or single metaphors first). We administered the pre-test as a pen and paper 
questionnaire that included two rating tables underneath each item. Target metaphors were 
presented in bold in the passage and participants were asked to rate that particular metaphoric 
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expression on a 1-7 scale in terms of comprehensibility (1 = Doesn’t make any sense to me – 
7 = Makes good sense to me) and familiarity (1 = Never heard it before – 7 = Common 
expression).  
Since the target metaphors were presented twice (once in each condition), participants were 
asked to base their familiarity ratings on their experience prior to the testing session in order 
to avoid artificially higher ratings in the second presentation. Also, participants were not 
allowed to look back in their questionnaires in order to avoid them giving the same score the 
second time they were presented with a metaphor. Participants were tested individually in a 
quiet room. 
 
Results 
For comprehensibility, the mean item ratings for the Single metaphor condition ranged from 
4.3-6.2, with a global mean of 5.2 (SD 0.62). The mean item ratings for the Extended 
metaphor condition ranged from 4.7-6.6, with a global mean of 5.7 (SD 0.55). A paired t-test 
disclosed a significant difference between the ratings in the two conditions (t = 3.91, df = 20, 
p < 0.001). 
For familiarity, the mean item ratings for the Single metaphor condition ranged from 1.8-5.2, 
with a global mean of 2.9 (SD 0.96). The mean item ratings for the Extended metaphor 
condition ranged from 1.9-4.7, with a global mean of 3.0 (SD 0.88). A paired t-test disclosed 
no significant difference between the ratings in the two conditions (t = 1.38, df = 20, p = 
0.18).  
Discussion 
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We conclude from the pre-testing of our materials that both the single and the extended 
metaphors were generally unfamiliar and highly comprehensible, notwithstanding the small 
but significant difference between comprehensibility ratings for the two conditions. We will 
further explore the possible consequences of this difference in subsequent analyses. 
 
Experiment 1: Self-paced reading task 
In this experiment, we contrast the processing of single metaphors, extended metaphors and 
literal expressions within a self-paced reading paradigm. As exemplified above, we control 
for variability in the reading times of different linguistic material by presenting the same 
critical phrases in the three conditions of interest. Within this paradigm, we would expect 
greater reading times where greater processing effort is required.  
Our prediction, based on Carston’s (2010) account, is that the reading times of the target 
expressions will be comparable when these are presented in the extended metaphor and in the 
literal context, as the linguistic material is initially interpreted purely literally in both cases. 
The reading times for the same material will be slower in the single metaphor condition, as in 
this case the figurative meaning is predicted to be immediately “cashed out” by the reader. 
 
Method 
Participants 
84 undergraduate and postgraduate students from University College London took part in the 
experiment. They were all native speakers of English and participated for monetary 
compensation (£3). 
Materials, design and procedure 
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We constructed 21 literal passages (average number of words: 59; range: 46-77) paired with 
the 21 extended and single metaphors. The literal passages included the same target 
expression (e.g., ‘protective gloves’ in the material sample given above) as the metaphors but 
used literally in an entirely literal context. The literal passages served as a control condition. 
We constructed 3 lists of materials, each containing 7 items of each experimental condition 
(Extended Metaphor, Single Metaphor and Literal) plus 21 filler items and 2 warm-up items. 
Like the experimental items, 1/3 of the filler items were literal and 2/3 included figurative 
language. For the self-paced reading task, each passage was divided into 8 segments (average 
number of words: 7.4; range: 3-10). One of these segments was the target expression, which 
appeared in isolation (average number of words: 5.1; range: 2-9).  
The experiment was programmed and run using E-prime. The experimental and filler items in 
each list were randomized individually for each participant. 
Participants were randomly allocated to one of the 3 lists. They were asked to read the 
passages at a normal pace, making sure they understood each passage. Participants had to 
press the space bar to move the text forward. In between each passage, a row of asterisks 
appear on the screen. Participants were given a short memory test at the end of the self-paced 
reading task, in which they had to recognize 2 passages that they had previously read in a list 
of 4 passages. Participants were told about the memory test in the instructions in order to 
make sure that they read the passages carefully. 
 
Results 
All participants passed the memory test. Results were analysed from 83 participants (one set 
of results was discarded as the reading times were unrealistically short). The raw data 
comprise 581 reading times per condition (7 each from 83 participants). For these raw data, 
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the mean reading time for the critical segments in the Literal condition was 1457ms (SD 
727ms), in the Extended Metaphor condition 1543ms (SD 764ms), and in the Single 
Metaphor condition 1578ms (SD 768ms). 
To remove outliers, we discarded data points which were more than 2.5 standard deviations 
from the mean for each participant (thus discarding a total of 9 data points in the Literal 
condition, 19 in the Extended Metaphor condition and 15 in the Single Metaphor condition). 
For the resulting 1704 data points, the mean response times for the critical segments were 
1421ms (SD 650ms) in the Literal condition, 1498ms (SD 716ms) in the Extended Metaphor 
condition, and 1537ms (SD 716ms) in the Single Metaphor condition. 
The initial hypothesis under test was that there would be a difference between, on the one 
hand, Single items, and on the other, Extended and Literal items (considered as a single 
category). We tested for this difference by using a linear mixed effects model, using the lmer 
function from the lme4 package (Bates et al. 2014) under the statistical computing language 
R (R Core Team 2014). In the model, we posited a main effect of Category (Single vs. Other) 
and random effects of Participant and Item, along with a random slope of Category by 
Participant (following Barr et al. 2013). The model disclosed a significant effect of Category, 
with the Single condition being read slower than the others (coefficient = 77.3, SE = 24.9, t = 
3.10, p < 0.01). 
However, follow-up pairwise comparisons of Condition levels, again using linear mixed 
models with random slopes, disclosed no significant difference between Extended and Single 
metaphors (coefficient = 38.4, SE = 29.7, t = 1.30, n.s.), but highly significant differences 
between each of these and the Literal condition (Literal vs. Extended: coefficient = 75.3, SE 
= 28.2, t = 2.68, p < 0.01; Literal vs. Single: coefficient = 114.7, SE = 28.6, t = 4.00, p < 
0.001). 
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We also wished to explore the relationship between the reading times for metaphoric 
expressions and their judged comprehensibility, as elicited in the pre-test. For the Single 
condition, we ran a further linear mixed model, positing a main effect of Comprehensibility, a 
random effect of Participant, and a random slope of Comprehensibility by Participant. There 
was a significant effect (coefficient = -121.8, SE = 42.1, t = -2.89, p < 0.01), suggesting that 
more comprehensible single metaphors were read faster. We did the same for the Extended 
condition, and a similar numerical effect did not reach significance (coefficient = -76.5, SE = 
43.4, t = -1.76, p = 0.084). 
Discussion 
The first comparison between reading times for the target expressions (e.g., ‘without 
protective gloves’) in the single-metaphorical condition, on the one hand, and in the extended 
metaphorical and literal conditions, on the other, supported the distinction predicted by 
Carston’s account, with reading times being significantly longer in the single metaphor 
condition. However, further pairwise comparisons seemed to support the standard RT 
account, with response times being significantly faster in the literal condition than in the two 
metaphorical conditions. The lack of a significant difference between the two metaphorical 
conditions also suggests that their difference in comprehensibility is very limited in its effect. 
Self-paced reading times, however, might not be sensitive enough to reveal nuanced 
differences in the processing of single and extended metaphors. It is for this reason that in 
Experiment 2 we used the same materials in a natural reading task coupled with eye-tracking. 
Relative to self-paced reading, eye-tracking during natural reading should reveal finer-
grained differences between the processing of the target expressions in the different contexts 
as it allows making a distinction between early and late processing measures. 
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Experiment 2: Eye-tracking during natural reading 
We implemented an eye-tracking experiment to provide a more precise measure of reading 
times over the same materials. In particular, we wished to explore whether the same 
distinctions between conditions observed in Experiment 1 were evident at all stages of 
processing, or a more complex pattern emerged when distinguishing early and late processing 
measures. If Carston (2010) is correct, the early processing measures should yield 
comparable results in the extended metaphor and literal conditions (since the target 
expressions would initially be processed literally in both conditions) but distinct results in the 
single metaphor condition (in which early processing already involves computation of the 
figurative meaning). By contrast, if we further assume, in line with Carston (2010), that 
readers of extended metaphors start to compute their figurative meanings in later processing, 
we would expect late processing measures to yield comparable results in the two metaphor 
conditions, both distinct from the literal condition (in which this additional processing is not 
necessary at any stage). This is a reasonable assumption considering our materials: the target 
expressions always appear in the second half of the extended metaphorical passages, by 
which stage readers should already have ‘switched’ to the literal-imagistic route of metaphor 
interpretation.1 As in Experiment 1, none of these predictions follow from the standard 
Relevance-Theoretic account of loose use. 
 
Method 
                                                            
1 It would also be compatible with Carston’s (2010) account if deeper and more reflective interpretation 
processes were to take place towards the end of figurative passages, but we did not test such off-line 
interpretation processes in our study. 
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Participants 
61 native English speakers were tested. They were recruited via University College London 
Psychology Subject Pool, and received £4 for their participation. Data from 11 participants 
were excluded due to failed calibration or track loss.  
Materials and Procedure 
The materials from the previous experiment were reused. Each participant read 21 
experimental sentences, 7 in the Extended Metaphor condition, 7 in the Single Metaphor 
condition, and 7 in the Literal Control condition. The sentences were presented in a random 
order.  
The experiment was programmed and run using the EyeTrack software version 7.10m (see 
http://www.psych.umass.edu/eyelab). Eye movements were recorded using the Eyelink 1000 
eye tracker developed by SR Research Ltd. The eye tracker was in a desktop mount 
configuration, and the recording was sampled at 1000Hz from the right eye. A chin and 
forehead rest was used to stabilize the participants' head position. Viewing distance was 
60cm. An experimenter sat on a nearby table facing the side of the participants. The 
experimenter and the participant could not see each other’s screens, but the experimenter 
could view the participant’s eye movements on her system. The screen resolution was set to 
be 1024 x 768 pixels. Texts were presented in size 14 Arial font, starting from 100 pixels 
from the left and 100 pixels from the top. The sentences wrap around at about 600 pixels 
from the left. At the start of the experiment, participants were briefed and instructed to read 
passages silently at their normal reading speed. Participants’ eye movements were calibrated 
and then validated using nine fixation points; when the calibration was classified as “good” 
by the EyeLink software, the experiment proceeded. 
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In the experiment, participants were first presented with three practice passages, of similar 
lengths to the experimental items but containing no metaphors. The practice was followed by 
21 experimental passages. Before each item, a fixation cross appeared in the centre of the 
screen. If the fixation was accurate, the experimenter would press a key to release the next 
item. The entire session lasted around 20 minutes per participant.  
Data analysis  
Individual participants’ eyetracking data was checked and preprocessed using the EyeDoctor 
software (see http://www.psych.umass.edu/eyelab). During this process, blinks and track loss 
were checked. If a blink or track loss occurred in the critical regions (corresponding with the 
target expressions), the trial was removed. This resulted in 9% data loss. Reading behaviours 
of the critical region and the word immediately after the critical region were analysed. We 
calculated seven processing measures, defined as follows.  
First fixation duration: the duration of initial fixation(s) in a region. We calculated the sum of 
all initial fixations in the critical region (if there was more than one initial fixation) rather 
than just the very first fixation because the critical region of many items contains several 
words, likely to incur more than one fixation. Thus, the very first fixation alone would not be 
an informative measure. 
First pass time: the duration of all fixations in a region before first moving out of the region 
(this includes regressions back to earlier parts of the sentence before moving on).  
Second pass time: the sum of durations of fixations in a region in subsequent passes after 
first moving out of the region. 
Spillover first fixation duration: the duration of the very first fixation after leaving the 
region. 
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Total time: the sum of the durations of all fixations in a region. 
Regressions in: the proportion of trials on which a regressive eye movement was made into a 
region. 
Regressions out: the proportion of trials on which a regressive eye movement was made out 
of a region.  
Following the consensus in the literature (e.g., Rayner 1998, Reichle et al. 1998), we assume 
that first fixation duration and first pass time reflect initial processing, while second pass 
time, proportions of regressions in and out and spillover first fixation duration reflect later 
processes. We assume that the total time reflects the overall processing effort. 
Note that spillover first fixation duration is not only affected by the processing of the critical 
region, but also by the length and frequency of the word immediately following the critical 
region. This word is identical in the single and extended metaphor conditions, but is 
sometimes different for the literal condition (see sample item above). To ensure that this 
measurement would be informative about the processing of the critical region, we compared 
the length of the words immediately following the critical region as well as their frequency, 
extracted from the British National Corpus (Leech et al. 2001). The average length is 3.86 
letters (SD 1.96) for the single and extended metaphor conditions and 4.05 letters (SD 1.94) 
for the literal condition. The average frequency is 1.72% (SD 2.6%) for the single and 
extended metaphor conditions and 1.28% (SD 2.1%) for the literal condition. Neither the 
lengths (t(20)= -0.45, p = 0.66) nor the frequencies (t(19)= 1.25, p = 0.23) differ significantly. 
If anything, the first word in the literal condition is numerically longer and less frequent than 
that of the metaphor conditions, both suggesting potential longer durations for the literal 
condition (Rayner 1998). 
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Results 
Analyses were conducted by fitting a linear (duration measurements) or logistic (proportion 
measurements) mixed effect model for each measurement, using the lmer function from the 
lme4 package (Bates et al. 2014) under the statistical computing language R (R Core Team 
2014). The fixed effect was Condition, and the random effects were Participants and Items. 
For all analyses, we report the estimates, standard errors, t-values or z-values as well as the p-
values for the fixed effects. For the three level analysis (Single Metaphor, Extended 
Metaphor and Literal), we also report the F-values and p-values for the main effect of 
Condition. 
Two-level analysis: first we compared the Single Metaphor condition with the other two 
conditions, Extended Metaphor and Literal (referred to as the “Literals” in Table 1), which 
should be comparable according to Carston (2010). Following the recommendations of Barr 
et al. (2013), we tried to fit maximal models which included random slopes and intercepts for 
both subjects and items. When fitting maximal models ran into convergence errors, we would 
modify the model by assuming independent intercepts and slopes for the random effects. 
When this ran into convergence errors, we would remove the random slopes for the random 
effects and keep the random intercepts. For this analysis, models for first pass time, second 
pass time and total time were maximal, models for first fixation duration assumed 
independent intercepts and slopes for the random effects, and models for spillover first 
fixation, proportions of regressions in and regressions out had random intercepts only.  
Table 1 reports the sample means of duration of proportion measures and model fitting results 
for the two conditions. The averages of all five duration measurements of the Single 
Metaphor condition were longer than the Literal conditions. Among them, the differences in 
total time and spillover first fixation duration were significant, and the difference in first 
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fixation duration was borderline significant (p = 0.05). This suggests that the critical region 
requires more processing effort in the Single Metaphor condition than in the other two 
conditions, and this difference is incurred from the earliest processing stages. There were no 
significant differences in regressions in and out.  
Table 1 Sample means and mixed effects regression results – two levels (Single versus 
Literals) 
 Sample Mean Model 
estimates 
Standard 
Errors 
  
  Single Literals Single Literals Single Literals t p 
First fixation (ms) 242 230 243 229 8.02 6.89 2.05 0.05 
First pass time (ms) 491 467 468 448 52.88 24.17 0.84 0.41 
Second pass time 
(ms) 
558 432 486 403 85.22 65.38 1.27 0.22 
Total time (ms) 634 575 620 558 73.5 26.85 2.3 0.03 
Spillover first fixation 
(ms) 
245 230 248 233 8.99 7.49 2.05 0.04 
        z p 
Regressions in (%) 9% 11% 8% 11% 0.31 0.33 -1.4 0.16 
Regressions out (%) 23% 23% 20% 20% 0.21 0.17 -0.09 0.93 
 
Three-level pairwise analysis: we then separated the Extended Metaphor condition from the 
Literal condition, and compared three levels: Single Metaphor, Extended Metaphor, and 
Literal. The models for first pass time and second pass time were maximal. The models for 
first fixation and spillover first fixation assumed independent intercepts and slopes for the 
random effects. The models for total time, regressions in and regressions out contained 
random intercepts only. 
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The results are reported in Table 2 and Table 3. Numerically, the Single Metaphor condition 
has longer mean durations in all five duration measures than the Extended Metaphor and the 
Literal conditions. Condition has a significant main effect on total time (Table 2). There is a 
significant difference between Single Metaphor and Literal, and a trending difference 
between Single Metaphor and Extended Metaphor. There is also a significant difference 
between Extended Metaphor and Literal (Table 3). In addition, pairwise comparison shows a 
trending difference (p = 0.05) between Single and Extended Metaphor conditions for first 
fixation duration (Table 3). 
Table 2 Sample means and mixed effects regression results – three levels (Single 
Metaphor, Extended Metaphor & Literal) 
 Sample mean Model Estimates Standard Errors   
 Single Extended Literal Single Extended Literal Single Extended Literal F p 
First fixation 
(ms) 
242 229 230 243 229 229 7.45 7.56 0.93 2.21 0.12 
First pass 
time (ms) 
491 478 454 468 460 437 20.13 24.93 20.63 0.48 0.63 
Second pass 
time (ms) 
558 412 461 486 401 390 70.02 40.49 60.93 0.96 0.39 
Total time 
(ms) 
635 598 553 623 582 531 23.22 63.98 23.26 7.51 6E-04 
Spillover 
first fixation 
(ms) 
245 234 227 249 239 228 10.37 11.88 11.77 1.87 0.17 
Regressions 
in (%) 
9% 15% 8% 11% 14% 11% 0.35 0.25 0.25 2.37 0.09 
Regressions 
out (%) 
23% 23% 24% 20% 19% 20% 0.2 0.21 0.19 0.07 0.94 
 
Table 3 Pairwise t values and p values from mixed effects regression 
 Single – Literal Single - Extended Extended – Literal 
 t p t p t p 
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First fixation (ms) 1.58 0.12 1.96 0.05 -0.12 0.9 
First pass time 
(ms) 
0.99 0.33 0.28 0.78 0.67 0.51 
Second pass time 
(ms) 
1.39 0.17 1.22 0.23 0.18 0.86 
Total time (ms) 3.00 0.007 1.68 0.09 2.2 0.03 
Spillover first 
fixation (ms) 
1.9 0.06 0.92 0.37 0.9 0.38 
 z p z p z p 
Regressions in 
(%) 
0.12 0.9 -1.75 0.08 -1.9 0.06 
Regressions out 
(%) 
-0.07 0.95 0.25 0.8 0.35 0.73 
 
Discussion 
The initial two-level analysis once again suggests a difference along the lines posited by 
Carston (2010) between, on the one hand, single metaphors, and on the other, extended 
metaphors and literal items, which is particularly manifest in total reading time. However, 
once again, the follow-up three-level analysis disclosed a more complex picture. First fixation 
time, regarded as a measure of early processing, appears to exhibit the distinction posited by 
Carston (2010), with the single condition giving rise to longer reading times, and no 
difference evident between the extended and literal conditions.  
For measures that are assumed to be reflective of later processing, the single condition again 
gives rise to numerically longer reading times, but the differences from the extended 
condition are no longer significant, suggesting that the two metaphoric conditions are 
beginning to pattern together more closely in later processing. These results bear out the 
predictions discussed above, and we interpret them as supportive of the second processing 
route posited by Carston (2010). In this processing mode, readers would have first extracted 
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the literal meanings of the extended metaphors and then started to compute their figurative 
meanings in later processing.  
 
Experiment 3: Cued recall 
In the last experiment of the study, we wanted to explore what effect potential differences in 
processing might have on readers’ recall of single and extended metaphors (for earlier studies 
of metaphor comprehension using cued recall, see McGlone (1996), Katz & Law (2010)). If 
single metaphors involve local pragmatic adjustment of the lexical meaning of the metaphor 
vehicle, but extended metaphors do not (because their literal meaning is processed globally 
for its metaphorical meaning), then the target expressions in our materials should be better 
remembered in the single-metaphorical condition than in the extended metaphorical 
condition. In this sense, the target expressions would have higher ‘distinctiveness’ in the 
former condition than in the latter; that is, they would stand out more clearly in the single-
metaphorical contexts, affecting memory positively (Hunt 1995, Hunt & Worthen 2006).  
It is worth stressing that the target expressions in our materials were not associated to 
previous words in the context in either metaphorical condition (in the extended metaphor 
condition, in particular, the target expressions were ‘secondary metaphors’). Therefore, it was 
not simply the case that the target expressions were less distinctive in the extended 
metaphorical condition because they were more strongly primed by other associates in the 
figurative passage. Our prediction is therefore based only on potential differences in 
processing between single and extended metaphors, as predicted by Carston (2010), and the 
effect that such processing differences would have on the distinctiveness of the two metaphor 
types. Note, in this respect, that the prediction following from Carston’s (2010) account 
regarding the memorability of single and extended metaphors is that this is related to, and not 
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an alternative explanation for, their potentially different distinctiveness (Hunt & Worthen, 
2006). In contrast, according to the standard Relevance-Theoretic account of metaphor 
interpretation, both single and extended metaphors would be processed via the same 
pragmatic mechanisms, not necessarily resulting in any differences in distinctiveness and 
memorability.  
 
Method 
Participants 
28 undergraduate and postgraduate students from University College London took part in the 
experiment. They were all native speakers of English and participated for monetary 
compensation (£4). 
Materials, design and procedure 
We constructed two booklets including 40 metaphors from our materials: 20 extended and 20 
single counterbalanced by booklet. For the memory prompts we used a strong associate of the 
metaphor vehicles (e.g., ‘without protective gloves’ > FINGERS). The structure of the 
booklet was as follows: on the first page of each item, participants were asked to read a 
passage carefully but only once. At the bottom of the page there was a table with 5 cells, and 
participants were asked to fill in 4 cells counting backwards in 3s from the number on the 
first cell (e.g., 73 – 70 – 67 – 64 – 61). The point of this secondary task was to prevent 
participants from responding to the cued-recall test from short-term memory. On the other 
side of the page, participants were asked to write down the first word that came to mind when 
reading a prompt (e.g., FINGERS: “Gloves”). Participants were not allowed to turn back the 
page to look at the passage, but they were allowed to complete the memory test in their own 
time. Participants were randomly allocated to one of the two booklets. 
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Results 
We compared the rates of recall for each participant between Extended (mean 5.2, SD 2.5) 
and Single (mean 6.5, SD 2.3) conditions using a paired t-test. This disclosed superior recall 
in the Single condition (t = 3.10, df = 27, p < 0.01). 
To test whether there were effects of comprehensibility on recall, we examined the total 
scores by item, and compared these with the comprehensibility ratings in the relevant 
condition (Extended or Single, as appropriate). For the Extended metaphors, there was a 
moderate positive correlation between comprehensibility ratings and recall (Pearson’s r = 
0.304). For the Single metaphors, there was also a moderate positive correlation between 
comprehensibility ratings and recall (Pearson’s r = 0.32).  
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 3 supported the hypothesis outlined above, with the target 
expressions being better recalled in the single-metaphorical condition (in which they would 
be interpreted by a local process of meaning modulation) than in the extended metaphorical 
condition (in which they would be interpreted literally, in line with the rest of the figurative 
passage). This appears to cohere better with an account in which single and extended 
metaphors are processed in different ways (such as that of Carston (2010)) than one in which 
metaphors of these different types are treated identically by the reader/hearer (such as the 
standard RT account of metaphor in terms of ad hoc concepts, e.g., Sperber & Wilson 2008). 
 
General discussion 
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This study investigated the distinction between the processing of single and extended 
metaphors proposed by Carston (2010) in her recent account of metaphor interpretation. In 
line with the standard Relevance-Theoretic account of metaphor as loose use, Carston argues 
that single metaphors are interpreted by a local pragmatic process of meaning adjustment, 
resulting in the construction of an ad hoc concept. In extended metaphorical passages, by 
contrast, the reader switches to a second processing mode, due to the mutual priming and 
reinforcing of the literal meaning by the various semantic associates in the passage.  
According to Carston, this second processing mode is characterised by a slower, more 
reflective type of processing in which the literal meaning of the whole passage is 
metarepresented and the intended figurative implications are only derived at a later stage of 
processing. 
The results of our study offer initial support to the view that single and extended metaphors 
are processed differently, in line with Carston’s (2010) account of metaphor interpretation. 
The results of Experiment 1 revealed longer reading times for the target expressions in the 
single metaphor condition compared to the extended metaphor and literal conditions (both of 
which would be interpreted literally, at least initially). Further analyses, however, revealed 
that this difference was mainly due to the faster reading times observed in the Literal 
condition. Experiment 2 offered more nuanced results with the use of eye-tracking during 
natural reading: early processing measures revealed comparable results in the extended 
metaphor and literal conditions, and suggested a small but significant difference between the 
extended and single metaphor conditions, in the direction predicted by Carston (2010). 
However, the distinction between the extended and single metaphor conditions ceased to be 
significant in later processing measures, again in accordance with the predictions. We 
interpreted this pattern of results as suggestive that readers had started to derive the figurative 
meanings of the extended metaphorical passages in later processing. 
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Finally, Experiment 3 tested the hypothesis that the same expression would be more 
distinctive and therefore better recalled as a single metaphor in an otherwise literal passage, 
than as a figurative expression in an extended metaphorical passage. Such a difference in 
cued recall would be consistent with Carston’s distinction between the processing of single 
and extended metaphors, while it would not be necessarily predicted by the standard RT 
account. The results of the third experiment supported the experimental hypothesis and 
revealed that our target expressions were better recalled in the single metaphor condition than 
in the extended metaphor condition.  
Taken together, the processing differences observed in our experiments suggest that there is 
validity to the claim that extended metaphors have the potential to engage a different mode of 
processing to that customarily engaged by single metaphors. However, one might criticize 
that by manipulating the contexts preceding the target expressions, we do not only distinguish 
the different conditions but also introduce possible other factors that could in principle affect 
the processing of the target expressions (e.g., varying word lengths and frequencies, different 
syntactic constructions, potential priming effects, and so on)2. Most of these factors should 
not result in any specific hypotheses that could be pinned against the two Relevance-
                                                            
2 While we acknowledge this shortcoming of our paradigm, we see it as inevitable insofar as 
it would be almost impossible to control for such a vast suite of potential factors in the 
construction of the materials. In other words, it would be extremely difficult to construct a 
battery of single metaphors, extended metaphors and literal controls that were preceded by 
contexts containing words of comparable length and frequency, identical syntactic 
constructions, the same potential priming effects, etc., while making sure that the passages 
are highly comprehensible.  
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Theoretic accounts of metaphor interpretation investigated in this study. It is conceivable that 
the flow of the narrative is more uneven in the simple condition compared to the extended 
condition, which could be associated with different processing costs, but none of the accounts 
offered so far make clear predictions about how this would influence our outcome measures.   
 
In general, given the limited scope of this study, it would be a considerable overreach to 
assume that the mode of processing depends wholly upon whether the metaphor is single or 
extended: in fact, if we grant the existence of these two modes, the precise conditions under 
which each is engaged remains a matter for further study (see Carston (2010: 311) for a 
discussion of metaphors that are not particularly lengthy but may nonetheless be interpreted 
via the secondary route).  Future theoretical and experimental work should therefore establish 
which factors might affect the use of one or the other processing mode (e.g., extension of the 
metaphor, topic of the discourse, imagistic component, etc.). 
The aim of the present study was to tease apart the standard RT account of loose use from the 
more recent proposal put forward by Carston (2010). While supportive of the latter, the 
processing differences observed in our study are generally compatible with other approaches 
to cognition (e.g., Clark, 2013). Pickering and Garrod (2013), for example, propose a theory 
that integrates language production and comprehension on the basis of prediction. It follows 
from this model that the interpretation of an extended metaphor would rely on the various 
semantic associates in the text priming each other and creating the expectation that the 
passage will continue in a coherent manner. While this much is compatible with Carston’s 
second processing route, a potential difference arises when dealing with the type of secondary 
metaphors that we used in our study: while interpretable in the passage, our target metaphors 
were not directly primed by other semantic associates earlier in the text. Therefore, Pickering 
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and Garrod’s model would predict that the interpretation of secondary metaphors in extended 
figurative passages should be more effortful than that of primary metaphors (which are 
semantically related to the main topic of the passage). By contrast, such a prediction would 
not necessarily follow from Carston’s model because the readers of our materials should have 
already switched to the literal/imagistic interpretive route when encountering the secondary 
metaphors, and this processing mode relies not so much on priming but on meta-representing 
the entire passage as an imagined world. 
Future studies might aim to provide more direct evidence for Carston’s (2010) account of two 
processing modes in metaphor interpretation. A promising line of investigation would be to 
compare the interpretation of the metaphors appearing at the beginning and the end of an 
extended figurative passage. In particular, it would be relevant to consider whether the literal 
meaning of these expressions is less accessible at the beginning of the text – when the reader 
is, according to Carston’s model, still trying to modulate the meaning of each metaphor 
individually – than at the end of the passage, when the reader should have already switched to 
the second processing route. 
 
Other extended figurative uses 
Another open question is whether the literal-imagistic interpretation that characterises the 
reading of extended metaphors is the same type of interpretation that arises in the case of 
allegories, parables and the like. Carston and Wearing (2011) have recently pointed out two 
important similarities between allegories and extended metaphors in relation to the second 
mode of processing proposed by Carston (2010): first, both literary devices are developed 
over the length of a whole passage or narrative, and second, they both have a superficial, 
literal meaning and a deeper, figurative meaning. On the basis of these similarities, Carston 
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and Wearing argue that it is likely that the interpretation of both analogies and extended 
metaphors includes a phase in which the literal meaning of the passage is metarepresented 
and parallel, deeper meanings are derived in further interpretive processes. On the other hand, 
the interpretation processes by which allegories and extended metaphors are fully understood 
are unlikely to be identical, given that allegories, unlike extended metaphors, are fully 
coherent at the literal level and can be superficially interpreted at that level alone (see Carston 
and Wearing (2011: 307-309) for further discussion and examples, and Gibbs and Blackwell 
(2012) for a case study of allegory interpretation).  
In conclusion, further theoretical work needs to be done in mapping out the processes 
underlying the interpretation of single and extended metaphors (a distinction currently only 
drawn by Carston (2010)), as well as allegories, parables and other extended figurative uses. 
Moreover, the possibility of categorical differences in the mode of metaphor processing 
suggested by our results urgently calls for further experimental research across this field, not 
least to ascertain whether existing findings about the time-course of interpretation can safely 
be generalised to all categories of metaphoric expression.  
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Appendix: Sample items from the experimental materials including extended 
metaphors (EM), single metaphors (SM) and literal controls (LC) with the target 
expression in bold. 
1/EM: In Martha’s experience, depression was a toad that squatted wetly on your head until it 
finally gathered the energy to slither off. Yet the unhappiness she had been living with for the 
last ten days was quite different. It was frantic and aggressive. It had sharp claws. It didn’t 
sit, it assailed.  
1/SM: Martha knew what depression was like. She often had bad periods when she didn’t 
want to do anything and had problems getting out of bed. Yet the unhappiness she had been 
experiencing for the last ten days was quite different. It had sharp claws. It was clear Martha 
needed professional help this time. 
1/LC: Martha regretted having brought home the stray cat that she had found in the park. At 
times it was frantic and aggressive. In the last two days, it had torn the curtains in the living 
room and destroyed the four legs of the kitchen table. It had sharp claws. Martha was afraid 
it might be too late to adopt such an old cat. 
2/EM: John's ambition was a racing car. He took every opportunity he had to overtake his 
rivals and challenge his teammates. He tore round and round the circuit until the grandstand 
would give him a standing ovation. John's boss praised him for his victories but secretly 
wondered where the finish line would be. 
2/SM: John was overly ambitious. Everything he did at work was part of a strategy to get a 
new promotion. He was very competitive and always expected that the grandstand would 
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give him a standing ovation. John’s boss was pleased with John’s work, but his colleagues 
were tired of his tactics.  
2/LC: John was training to become a Formula 1 driver That was his only dream and he was 
determined to work hard until the day he could tear round and round the circuit and the 
grandstand would give him a standing ovation. But for now it was all about working hard. 
3/EM: Helen spoke with the soothing tones of a skilled healer. If she was in the right mood, 
her words had a soft edge that could magically cure you of all your ailments without any 
medicine. But if she thought a treatment was needed, she would apply her scalpel close to 
your heart, so you might find yourself wounded by the long blade of a ‘why’ or the 
incurable silence of a full stop. 
3/SM: Helen was very articulate. She always explained everything clearly and in just enough 
detail to make it interesting. If you needed help, she could make you regain perspective with 
just a few words. But her words could also be acutely penetrating. Sometimes she would 
apply her scalpel close to your heart, and her words would leave you hurting for days. 
3/LC: Helen had spent eight years in medical school and another four years training as a 
cardiac surgeon before she got her first job. But she never questioned her choices. She had 
wanted to become a doctor ever since she was a kid. Helen felt most empowered at the start 
of a surgery, when she would apply her scalpel close to the heart, her patient’s life in her 
hands. 
4/EM: When Gina’s employees were cooperative, they could achieve great things together. 
They were a choir in perfect harmony, the delicate notes of the sopranos blending perfectly 
with the powerful rumble of the basses. After the performance, Gina had merely to pick up 
the bouquets thrown onto the stage. But when they were uncooperative, the resulting 
cacophony assailed the senses. 
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4/SM: When Gina’s employees were cooperative, they could achieve great things together. 
They complemented one another beautifully, the imagination of the creative thinkers being 
made real by the labour of the diligent workers. On these occasions, Gina had merely to pick 
up the bouquets thrown onto the stage. But when they were uncooperative, the company 
rapidly descended into chaos. 
4/LC: Gina’s job with the opera company could be difficult.  She was responsible for making 
sure the performances went smoothly, which was no easy task when the singers were at their 
most egotistical.  When things had gone well, Gina had merely to pick up the bouquets 
thrown onto the stage.  On other occasions, she would spend hours trying to placate the 
furious performers. 
5/EM: Louise had remarkable mental abilities. Her brain was a computer, in which every 
data file was neatly stored away in the appropriate directory and could be accessed and 
operated upon at the touch of a button. However, just lately, there was the occasional power 
outage. Abruptly she would find herself unable to respond to the simplest request. 
5/SM: Louise had remarkable mental abilities. She possessed formidable command of facts, 
and could supply information and reason about it at impressive speed. However, just lately, 
there was the occasional power outage. Abruptly she would find herself unable to respond 
to the simplest request. 
5/LC: The executives at the company were very concerned about the electricity supply.  All 
the data on the network was stored on servers which had to be constantly running.  However, 
just lately, there was the occasional power outage.  Today they were considering whether to 
invest in backup generators. 
 
